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SPEECH

THE MOLLEN COMMISSION AND BEYOND*
HON. HAROLD BAER, JR.**
I am glad to be here today and I want to thank Dean Wellington' for
giving Ross Sandier2 some really needed support to get symposia like this

off the ground. In writing down my thoughts on police corruption in
preparation for this speech, I found I became somewhat more critical than
I used to be on the subject. My statements, I hope everyone will
understand, are only meant to foster constructive change.

For the first time in the hundred year history of police corruption
investigations, the Mollen Commission" did something a little different.

It was an effort to approach the problem with the hope of ending these
apparent twenty-year cycles of police corruption scandals. 4 Previously,

each investigation came about as a consequence of outcries disparaging the
conduct of men and women entrusted with the health and safety of New

Yorkers.'
* Judge Baer delivered these remarks at a symposium sponsored by the New York
Law School Law Review in conjunction with the New York Law School Center for New
York City Law on March 30, 1995 entitled Police Corruption, Municipal Corruption:
Cures at What Cost? [hereinafter Symposium].
** United States District Court Judge, Southern District of New York. Judge Baer
was also a member of the Mollen Commission.
1. Harry Wellington, Dean of New York Law School, 1991 to present.
2. Ross Sandier, Professor and Director, Center for New York City Law, New
York Law School.
3. See N.Y. CITY COM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUFrION

AND THE ANTi-CORRUprIoN PROC. OF THE POLICE DEP'T, COMM'N REP. (July 7, 1994)
(Milton Mollen, Chair) [hereinafter MOLLEN COMM'N REP.].
4. See id. at 149 (describing historical pattern of police corruption and underlying
Commission considerations for reformation).
5. See, e.g., REP. OF THE COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE
CORRUFrION AND THE CrrY's ANTI-CORRUPTION PROC. (Dec. 26, 1972) (Whitman
Knapp, Chair) [hereinafter KNAPP COMM'N REP.]; Hearing Held at the United States
Court House, Foley Square, New York, N. Y., Mar. 14, 1951 before the Senate Special
Comm. to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess.
975 (1951); SUP. CT., APP. Div., FIRST JUD. DEP'T, FINAL REP. OF SAMUEL SEABURY,
REFEREE, IN THE MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION OF THE MAGISTRATE CTS. IN THE
FIRST Jun. DEP'T AND THE MAGISTRATES THEEOF, AND OF ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW
PRACTICING IN SAID CTS. (Mar. 28, 1932) (Samuel Seabury, Referee) [hereinafter
SEABURY REP.]; REP. OF THE SPECIAL COMM. OF THE BOARD OF ALDERMAN OF THE
CITY OF N.Y. TO INVESTIGATE THE POLICE DEP'T (June 10, 1913) (Henry H. Curran,
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Generally, these outcries were heard every twenty years or so

beginning with Lexow in 1894.6 Each of the investigations found more
than they bargained for and sometimes other governmental entities tried

desperately to circumscribe their powers. In fact, the governor back in
18941 refused to sign the request by the senate for the $30,000 they
needed to get their investigation off the ground. 8
Similarly, in the Mollen Commission, we recommended a continuing

oversight mechanism for the Police Department.9 The Mayor failed to act
and then vetoed legislation passed by the City Council which created such
a continuing oversight board.10 The Council then voted forty-one to
eight to override the Mayor's veto.11
The recommendations from past investigators concentrated on better
methods by which to investigate and root-out bad cops. While this is a
laudable goal, it is to a large extent akin to the way in which we have
approached our penal system over the last century. More and more
legislators pressured by scared constituents have championed enhanced
sentences. Little change has resulted. Few, if any, studies suggest that

the increased use of minimum mandatory sentences has reduced

recidivism,12 and all agree that in these days of fiscal restraint they have

pushed our jails and penitentiaries to the breaking point.3 In the same
Chair) [hereinafter CURRAN COM. REP.]; REP. AND PROC. OF THE SENATE COMM.
APPOINTED TO INVESTIOATE THE POLICE DEP'T OF THE CITY OF N.Y. AS TRANSiffTED
TO THE LEGISLATURE (Jan. 18, 1895) (Senator Clarence Lexow, Chair) [hereinafter
LEXow COMM. REP.].
6. LExOW COMM. REP., supra note 5.
7. Roswell P. Flowers, Governor of the State of New York, 1892-94.
8. LEXoW COMM. REP., supranote 5, at 9-14 (the Lexow Committee reprinted the
gubernatorial veto of the State Senate Appropriations Bill that would have provided
funding to investigate police corruption).
9. MOLLEN COmm'N REP., supra note 3, at 148-57.
10. See Jonathan P. Hicks, Council Creates Police Monitor, But Giuliani Plans to
Ignore Vote, N.Y. TMEs, Jan. 20, 1995, at Al, B4 (stating that the City Council voted
to create an independent agency to guard against corruption even though the Mayor had
vetoed an earlier Council vote which created an independent agency).
11. But see Mayor of New York v. Council of New York, No. 402354, 1995 WL
478872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 30, 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-3710 (1st Dep't N.Y.
App. Div. Nov. 16, 1995) (holding that the New York City Council's attempt to create
the Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board violated the New York City
Charter).
12. See generally Gary Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the
Effectiveness of Determinative Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 72 (1993)
(discussing the exploding prison population as a result of mandatory sentencing).
13. See id.
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way, simply adding another level of bureaucracy with more investigators
to ferret out police corruption has never and will never do the trick. Like
enhanced sentences, it is the easy fix which satisfies the public but fails to
make a lasting improvement. If this was the answer, there would have
been no need for a new investigation every twenty years.
As I said before, the Mollen Commission's emphasis was a little
different. It was an effort to approach all aspects of the problem of police
corruption.14 We investigated corruption allegations, 5 ind discussed
with law enforcement representatives different oversight modalities, 6 and
agreed that investigative efforts were necessary; necessary, as both Mike
Armstrong 17 and Joe Armao 8 have mentioned, for the small group of
corrupt cops. We were also sure that the Police Department had to have
the major role in weeding out corruption, 9 but we were equally certain
that some outside entity had to be continuously aware and concerned about
what the Department was doing to fight corruption in its ranks.'
These recommendations were the more traditional part of the equation,
similar, to some extent, to the special prosecutor's office that grew out of
the recommendation from Mike Armstrong and the Knapp Commission.21
We were anxious to explore another level of the problem, to look at
some of the root causes of corruption, and, if discoverable, to delineate
what they were and to include a study of these culture problems amongst
14. See MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra note 3, at 4-8.
15. Id. at 7-9, 11-15 (describing the methods the Commission used to reach its
conclusions and recommendations, including conducting field investigations; reviewing
case files; interviewing police officers as well as local, state, and federal law
enforcement officials; conducting hearings on corruption control; interviewing private
citizens, criminal defense attorneys, alleged victims of corruption, and criminal
informants; and holding discussions with police management and corruption experts).
16. Id.
17. Michael F. Armstrong, Chief Counselto the Knapp Commission. See generally
KNAPP CONIM'N REP., supra note 5, at 35-60 (discussing the history and methodology
of the Knapp Commission). Mr. Armstrong also participated in the Symposium. See
Michael F. Armstrong, Speech: Police Corruption:An HistoricalOverview, 40 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REv. 59 (1995).
18. Joseph P. Armao, Chief Counsel to the Mollen Commission. See generally
MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supranote 3, at 1-10 (discussing the commission's methodology
and findings). Mr. Armao has also contributed to this issue. See Harold Baer, Jr. and
Joseph P. Armao, The Mollen Commission Report: An Overview, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 73 (1995).
19. MOLLEN COMM'N REp., supra note 3, at 7, 149.
20. Id. at 7, 152-57.
21. Id. at 72 n.10; see KNAPP COMM'N REP., supra note 5, at 35-38.
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the tasks of the independent oversight entity.'
It became the
Commission's view that some of the corruption in the Department came
about as a result of certain views and procedures in the Department.'
Whether we were right remains to be seen, but clearly, valid theories
support our conclusions.
Probably most important amongst these entrenched and seemingly
immutable Department problems, has to do with the training the Police
Department provides.' The academy, for instance, is a requirement for
each and every recruit. While the recruits may have had other educational
experiences, this is where they must go to learn to be police officers.
Even the nationally recognized cadet program at John Jay College of

Criminal Justice z cannot serve as a substitute.
As we discovered, the anti-corruption curriculum consisted in large
part of a twenty-year-old movie and according to one or more
witnesses, instead of being a training ground to deter corruption, the

Police Academy was where some recruits first learned about being
corrupt.' Probably the most unfortunate aspect of the training at the
police academy is the drafting of the new recruits into the "we against
them" tenent of police work.' Recruits graduated from the academy
almost as if Thomas Hobbes had been their professor and instilled the

concept of a nasty and brutish citizenry, and a short career 29 for any cop
that left the academy with a different view. This approach fostered the
22. MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra note 3, at 149; see also id. at 110-28
(determining that the core causes of corruption include police culture and management,
command accountability, internal investigations, deterrence and sanctioning standards,
and community outreach concerns).
23. Id. at 70-110 (discussing, among other problems, the ineffective field
supervision of police officers, willful blindness, the supervising officers' fear of
disclosing corruption within the department, and the overall collapse of the department's
corruption controls as part of the causes of corruption in the department).
24. See id. at 58-60 (discussing the problem that veteran officers taught recruits that
the "ordinary citizen fails to appreciate the police").
25. See generally Gerald W. Lynch, Make College a Cop Requisite, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, June 21, 1995, at 25 (discussing the City University of New York/New York
Police Department Cadet Corps Program where cadets receive training at John Jay
College of Criminal Justice once a week).
26. See MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra note 3, at 108.
27. See id. at 55.
28. See id. at 51, 59.
29. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 76 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publishing
Co., Inc. 1994) (1668) (Hobbes wrote "Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of
Warre .... In such condition there is no place for Industry .... And the life of man,
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.").
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related cultural shibboleth that the Department could survive only where
a blue wall of silence prevailed.' A sad message any day, but worse yet
in the days of community policing.31 When we add to this the
Department's brooding omnipresence of insularity, 32 second to none, a
change in culture merits real attention.
In addition to required attendance at the academy, the Department
permits no outside instructors, as if only police can teach police, no new
ideas from the outside are countenanced. 33
While loyalty in a
paramilitary operation like the Police Department, or for that matter, in
most any organization is important, forthrightness about wrongdoing, even
if it's your buddies' wrongdoing, must be instilled as a facet of the police
officer's modus operandi.
To stand by, as reports showed,35 while criminal acts are committed
by fellow officers can only increase corrupt activity. Training must be
broadened; a curriculum with experts from many fields must participate
in a teaching experience that will foster loyalty in times of danger, but
will at the same time advocate enhanced ethical behavior.3 6
Another area of the Department's culture that deserves attention is
diversity.3
Captains and above, to say nothing of police officers and
Police Benevolent Association3 8 leaders, must all be urged to participate

in a sophisticated training program. This need is heightened by various
30. See MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra note 3, at 53-58 (discussing code of silence
as an entrenched loyalty ethic that deters officers from reporting misconduct and thus
fuels corruption).
31. See generally Sam Roberts, As Police ForceAdds to Ranks, Some PromisesStill
Unfufilled, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1994, § 1, at 35 (discussing Mayor David Dinkins's
"Safe Street, Safe City" promise in 1990 which would include a return to community
policing where officers would be deployed on neighborhood patrols).
32. See MOLLEN COMV'N REP., supra note 3, at 80.
33. See id. at 59 (discussing police officers' belief that their safety depends solely
on their fellow officers).
34. Id. at 58.
35. See id. at 51-58 (describing how fellow officers turn a blind eye to corrupt
activities as a result of the code of silence).
36. ld. at 60-63.
37. See id. at 66 (stating that the Department should take into account the new
demographics of the police force).
38. See id. at 66-68 (stating that the union representing police officers, the Police
Benevolent Association may have a role in perpetuating police corruption because in
some instances they help reinforce the code of silence and advise witnesses not to
cooperate).
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problem situations revealed at our hearings. 9 For example, the hearings
showed a high crime precinct in a minority neighborhood was staffed by
marginally competent white police officers,' a precursor for trouble. To
run a Department eighty percent white and twenty percent minority 4' in
a city that is quickly becoming the opposite,42 without a real effort at
diversity training-at teaching understanding-is more than harmless error.
This was known even back in the 1960s, under the leadership of the late
Commissioner Vincent Broderick.4 3
Back then, the Department
established training programs that stressed both sensitivity to diversity and
the notion of civil rights in the Department's relations with the general
public.'
While the Department's neglect in the area of diversity training will
result in escalating brutality complaints, it may, without attention, spark
even more explosive problems for our city. Yet the Department and its
leadership remain so insular and so introspective that outside help
regardless of where it may be offered, seems to be totally disregarded. 45
Let me read you-since I see that Commissioner Bratton is here-a
portion of a letter I wrote to him, dated February 3, 1995.
Dear Bill, I wrote to you on September 30th about the
Department's doing some diversity training. I was concerned
then and am concerned even more now that no experts from
outside the Department have been employed to do diversity
training. This would enable your department to better approach
diversity issues in the Department itself and in the community.
39. See id. at 91-101.
40. See id. at 61-62.
41. Catherine S. Manegold, Rally Puts Police Under New Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMIES,
Sept. 27, 1992, § 1, at 35 (stating that 22% of the Department consists of minorities).
42.

U.S.

BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATE AND METROPOLITAN AREA DATA BOOK,

1986, at 203 (1986) (Table A-Metropolitan Areas, Population Statistics); U.S. BUREAU
OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1994, at 45 (114th ed.

1994) (Table 46-Cities With 100,000 or More Inhabitants in 1992) (listing New York
City as having a 40.75% minority population in 1986 as compared with a 53.1%
minority population in 1990, a 12.35% rise in the City's minority population during the
six-year period).
43. New York City Police Commissioner, 1965-66.
44. See Selwyn Raab, Rising Brutality Complaints Raise QuestionsAbout New York
Police, N.Y. TIMs, May 6, 1985, at Al (noting sensitivity training of the 1960s).
45. See generally Clifford Krauss, Police Report Recommends More Training and
Oversight, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1994, at Al (discussing a police task report that
recommends internal department structural changes, but makes no mention of the
independent monitor suggested by the Mollen Commission).
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I know how busy you are and how much mail you receive, but I
do hope that on this occasion, you will find the time to
respond. 46
I never heard a word in response. I must say that while federal
judges occasionally find themselves upsetting people they call and write,
in my experience, they always get a response. This attitude, I'm sure, is
just the product of the kind of time problems and obligations that the
Department has, but that is the point: those obligations, it seems to me,
require some refocusing.47 Clearly corruption must be ferreted out and
punished. It is equally clear that enduring change requires constant
attention to create and maintain a different mind set in the Department.
It is this aspect, this different emphasis of the Mollen Commission work,
which may be the lasting legacy of that experience.

46. Letter from Harold Baer, Jr., United States District Judge, Southern District of
New York, to William Bratton, New York City Police Commissioner (Feb. 3, 1995) (on
file with the New York Law School Law Review).
47. Shortly after the Symposium, Commissioner Bratton informed Judge Baer that
he would be appointing a commission to review so-called culture problems within the
New York City Police Department, including problems relating to diversity training. See
Letter from Harold Baer, Jr., United States District Court Judge, Southern District of
New York, to New York Law School Law Review (Nov. 15, 1995) (on file with the New
York Law School Law Review).

